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Abstract 
Wage Structure and Labor Mobility in the Netherlands 1999-20031
 
 
 
In this paper we document the wage structure and labor mobility in the 
Netherlands in the period 1999-2003. We explain the importance of wage-
setting institutions in the Netherlands and the main actors. The analyses are 
based on administrative sources allowing for comparisons between and within 
firms, and in which workers can be followed over time. In the period 
investigated the Netherlands experienced an increase in wage inequality. 
Despite the centralized system of wage negotiations in the Netherlands, our 
findings suggest that market forces were the main determinant of wage growth. 
Workers with similar wages experienced similar wage increases in firms of 
different sizes. Wages increases were larger for low-skilled workers in 
industries with large increases in demand than in other industries. Variation in 
wage growth was mainly at the individual level. Firm-level wage increases 
accounted for only 12 % of the total variation. 
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11 Introduction
Labor relations in the Netherlands are subject to an intensive system of negotiations
between employer associations, trade unions and the government. Every year, starting at
a centralized level, these three parties discuss the economic developments, aiming for
agreement on the desirable development of wages. Moderate development of wages to
stimulate employment growth has always been an important theme in these negotiations.
This agreement serves as advice for negotiations between union and employers'
associations at industry level. Collective agreements in industries are generally extended
by the Minister of Social Affairs, which means that the agreement applies to all workers
and firms within the industry, also those who are not represented by a trade union of
employer association.
This structure suggests that wage development is highly centralized and focused
on wage moderation. In contrast, the Dutch labor market also has clearly individualized
features. Union membership is low, a high share of employment is in the service sector
while the fraction of workers in the traditionally much more organized industry is small.
A large fraction of firms explicitly apply some kind of performance pay and in many
more firms managers have performance interviews with their employees, which may lead
to extra wage increases or promotion. Even in the public sector, these modern human
resource practices are well-developed.
The aim of this paper is to explain the institutional setting and the main actors of
wage determination in the Netherlands and to investigate the influence of the centralized
bargaining system on the Dutch wage structure and to see to what extent individual
factors, developments at the firm level, and market developments determine wages. We
will also relate wage developments to worker mobility, since this may be a way in which
workers respond to rigid wage structures. The analyses are based on administrative data,
collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) from various sources, bringing together wage
information about all employment relationships held in the Netherlands. Currently this
data set covers the period 1999-2003. Our main findings for this period were that the
Netherlands clearly experienced an increase in wage inequality, especially among men.
This pattern was very similar when comparing firms of different size, while specific
2industries revealed patterns that substantially deviated from the overall pattern. Young
people in all wage categories faced, on average, much higher wage increases than others.
Decomposing the wage growth into an industry component, a firm component, and an
individual component, showed that by far most of the variation in wage growth was
individual. On average, only 12% of the variance was firm-specific. Industry-specific
wage growth was almost negligible. In smaller firms, however, the development of wages
was much more firm-specific. Mobility rates were relatively high among workers in firms
with low wage growth as well as firms with high wage growth. This relationship exists
when we look at differences both between and within industries in the wage development
of a firm.
The period of investigation was characterized by relatively high wage growth (Ter
Weel, 2003). Although economic performance was already deteriorating after the boom
in the late 90s, the labor market was still heated, especially because of shortages for
higher educated workers in general and low-skilled workers in some specific industries
(esp. the building industry, ROA, 2005). Our findings therefore suggest that wage
formation in the Netherlands – at least in this period – was determined mainly by the
development of the scarcity of human capital on the one hand, and by individual career
developments on the other. Neither collective agreements, nor the profitability of firms
seemed to have great effects.
We will proceed as follows in this paper. In Section 2, we will provide a detailed
description of the institutional actors and processes of wage determination in the
Netherlands and economic conditions in the period investigated. In Section 3, we will
describe the data. Section 4 provides the results of the analyses, and Section 5 contains
our conclusions.
2 Institutional Setting
2.1 Characteristics of the Dutch Economy
The Dutch economy is a corporative economy, in which the government, employers'
associations and trade unions are focused on deliberation and consensus. It can be
characterized as a capitalist state of the Rhineland model. The model is based on a
3regulated market economy and an extensive system of social security. The government,
the employers' associations and the trade unions negotiate about goals and appropriate
measures to reach these goals. One of the main aims is sustainable and socially
responsible economic growth. Social responsibility and solidarity are some of the main
characteristics of this state model.
Until 1982, the Dutch economy was often called the “welfare state without work.”
In 1982, 13% of the Dutch labor force was unemployed and almost the same number was
on social welfare programs, especially early retirement and disability programs. The
broad unemployment rate was 28% of the labor force (OECD, 1982). Since 1982, the
Dutch economy tackled its labor market problems by applying strict wage moderation,
welfare reform, activating labor market policies, and measures to increase labor market
flexibility.
From the 1990s onwards, the performance of the Dutch economy improved
substantially. Some authors refer to wage moderation as the main explanation (Dur, 2001;
Den Butter and Mosch, 2003), others argue that the flexibility of the economy was the
main cause (Hartog, 1999; Broersma, Koeman, Teulings, 2000), while the third
explanation could be that the composition of the Dutch industrial landscape, with many
people working in the service industry, explains the favorable situation (OECD, 2006).
2.2 Wage negotiations
The legal framework of Dutch industrial relations was put in place in the 1930s. As a
consequence of the recession between the wars, the collective agreement received public
protection as a measure against unfettered wage competition. After 1945, the role of the
state expanded and for two decades the Netherlands maintained a statutory wage policy.
This policy was closely to the central union and employers' federations, the STAR
(“Stichting van de Arbeid”), the bipartite Foundation of Labor in which unions and
employers have been meeting since 1945, and the SER (“Sociaal Economische Raad”),
the government’s main advisory council on social and economic policies.
A new wage act in 1970 deprived the government of part of its power. From that
time onwards, the government was only supposed to intervene during a stalemate of
negotiations or to suspend contracts. Nevertheless, between 1973 and 1982 these powers
4were used seven times, so wage negotiations in that time could hardly be described as
bipartite. 1982 was said to be the year of the return to voluntary wage moderation without
the threat of government intervention. Dutch unions, although weakened by severe job
and membership crises of the early 80s (Van den Berg, 1998), but assured of continued
institutional support, have chosen publicly a "jobs before wages" strategy (Visser and
Hemerijk, 1998).
Actual negotiations on contracts and wages are traditionally done by sector in the
Netherlands. This means that for each trade or sector, a separate collective agreement
(CAO) is made. However, the trade unions and firms negotiating in a sector or trade are
either directly or indirectly guided by their respective central organization. These central
organizations are the actors in the national debate on targets, goals and aims of the
bargaining process, set forth in the agreements at the end of every year. This combination
of centralized “pre-bargaining” and goal-setting combined with decentralized negotiating
over the actual form of the new wage contracts, leads to flexibility without overlooking
the macroeconomic repercussions of sectoral wage contracts for the rest of the economy.
In the context of “globalization”, the trend in the Netherlands was to give more leeway to
bargaining within a sector, to allow for necessary variation across sectors.
The set-up of organizations implies that macroeconomic conditions provide major
feedback on wage formation. A typical example is the “Wassenaar Agreement” of 1982,
which marked the starting point of wage moderation. Instead of a collective agreement, it
was an agreement of the centralized trade unions, employers' associations and the
government to implement wage moderation in the collective agreements of the coming
year. This was to be the general framework for the collective agreements in different
sectors.
Traditionally, the Dutch had tripartite negotiations. Since 1982, negotiations can
be called bipartite. But even if the government officially is no longer a direct partner in
the bargaining process, the public and political debate plays an important role in the
results of the negotiations. The distance between the negotiators is small by any means,
physically, socially, and – since the 1980s – also ideologically.
Close co-operation of the parties involved has been institutionalized in the
Netherlands through the existence of numerous foundations, councils, committees and
5commissions, in which parties meet regularly. Because of this system and the small size
of the country, trade partners know each other and meetings may take place in an
informal manner. The most important institutions in this context are the aforementioned
STAR and the SER.
STAR (“Stichting van de Arbeid”1) was founded 1945 as a private committee by
trade union confederations and employers' associations. Its goal was to create a common
meeting point to discuss issues relating to social security, pensions, taxes and wage
formation. STAR publishes proposals and agreements guiding the annual contractual
wage negotiations. Part of its advisory function is even laid down in law.2 The SER
(“Sociaal Economische Raad”3) is a meeting point for members of STAR with the
cabinet and was founded 1950 as an organization under public law and part of a
corporatist civil order of the economy. The SER is also the most important council for the
government in social and economic issues. The organization of SER is tripartite.
Employers and employees each have eleven seats; another eleven seats are for
independent members appointed by the government.
The organization of employees in trade unions started between 1905 and 1920.
But they were not accepted as negotiation partners for collective bargaining until the
1920s. Today, union membership in the Netherlands is quite low. Nevertheless a broad
majority agrees with the unions’ policies. In the Netherlands, there are four trade union
federations which cover all sectors. Representing 63% of all union members, the Dutch
Trade Federation (FNV, “Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging”) is the most important
one, followed by the Christian National Trade Federation (CNV, “Christelijk Nationaal
Vakverbond”), representing 18% of all members, the General Trade Federation (AVC,
“Algemene Vakcentrale”), and the Trade Federation for Higher  Employees and Senior
Officials (MHP, “Vakcentrale voor Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel”) both with 9% of
the total number of members. Trade unions need to co-operate during negotiations, to
avoid the threat of being excluded. Trade unions are subdivided into units per sector. The
1 In English “The Labor Foundation”
2 The Minister for Social Services and Employment formally has to ask for advice if there is disagreement
on the general nature (sanctioning) of a CAO.
3 In English “The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands”
6largest trade union in this respect, is the one for the civil servants; still the leading trade
union within the negotiations is the industrial federation (IB).
Even though the federations share the same goal, they differ in terms of tradition,
religion and ideology. This differentiation is still a relict from the times of the
denominationalism of the Dutch society until the seventies. FNV is a result of a merger of
the socialist and the Catholic sections, whereas the CNV's roots are in the Protestant
denomination. The important goals of all trade unions include employment growth, wage
moderation, reduction of working hours, preventing high wage spread between
companies and sectors, preserving a proper social security system.
The degree membership among employers is quite high. Sixty to seventy per cent
of all employees in the private sector work in companies that are members of an
employers' organization. 83% of all Dutch employees are covered by a collective
contract, 14% by company contracts (very large companies such as Phillips have their
own agreements), while 69% are covered by sectoral contracts. In the Netherlands, there
are three main employers' associations: VNO-NCW (Verbond van Nederlandse
Ondernemingen – Nederlands Christelijke Werkgeversverbond) for large companies,
MKB for small and medium-sized companies, LTO (“Land- en tuinbouworganisatie”)
Nederland, for the agricultural sector.
Despite the decentralization of 1993, many ties can still be found between the
approximately 5,000 negotiators involved in bargaining for the 720 collective agreements
(Visser & Hemerijk, 1998). The bargaining and agreement process typically goes through
several stages  (de Kam et al., 1994).
The first stage is in the summer period of each year. When all collective
agreements for the current year have been settled, claims for the coming year start to
emerge. This is also to influence the government in its budget planning for the coming
year.
The second stage consists of discussions and negotiations within STAR and SER.
If these negotiations are successful, they lead to a central agreement within STAR, which
provides general guidelines for the sectoral negotiations.
7The third stage, usually at the beginning of the new year, is then the actual
negotiations for each sector.4 These negotiations result in the final contractual
agreements. The federation usually sets out some guidelines, which are then detailed by
the negotiators for the different sectors and levels of negotiation.
The government has the possibility of sanctioning the CAO result, making it
binding for all workers involved. This means that even non-unionized employees and
firms have to follow the stipulated contract. This is usually done, since the CAOs are
almost always transferred into law, thus becoming binding for all workers in the sector.
Government influence on wage formation has a long tradition in the Netherlands.
Between 1945 and 1970, Dutch wage policies were controlled by the state. All
agreements had to be submitted to a body of experts appointed by the government.
Agreements became effective after acceptance by this body. Even after 1970, when a new
wage law came into force that returned responsibility for wage setting to employers and
employees, the state was able to influence wage negotiations in the case of an “economic
emergency situation”. As mentioned above, such an “emergency” occurred seven times
in the twelve years between 1970 to 1982.  Most of the state interventions were necessary
because employees and employers were unable to agree. It was not until the Wassenaar
Agreement in 1982 that trade partners became autonomous in their wage setting. The
power of the government to threaten with state intervention if trade partners could not
reach an agreement in their negotiations, forced the partners to find a compromise. The
possibility of government intervention enabled the trade unions to explain unpopular
wage agreements to their members.
At the central level, government is very much involved in Dutch wage
negotiations. It is a participant in the discussion on general agreements through the SER,
even though it is not directly involved in the drafting of the agreements in the STAR.
Through changes in taxes and the social security system, which is set out in the
government's budget (“Miljoenennota”), it also influences both the general agreements
4  Actually, the term "sector" is not entirely correct, because collective agreements are not necessarily
negotiated for sectors or industrial branches, but can be also on the firm level. The units of collective
agreements developed historically, and are mutually accepted. They usually follow some sector (e.g.
chemical industry), but some firms, such as AKZO, have their own firm-level CAO agreement.
8and the final sectoral collective agreements. These changes must be implemented through
the political process and approved by parliament.
At sectoral level, the government also plays the role of a moderator. For example,
the government pointed out that unemployment benefits could not be maintained at the
current level if agreed wage increases were too high, as this could lead to a further rise of
unemployment. This underlines the solidarity aspect of Dutch culture. Another example
is that the government has been lowering the wedge between wage costs and net wages,
in order to support wage moderation. The government has also restrained wages of civil
servants and related employees to a great extent. Direct government involvement follows
from the fact that it has to sanction Collective Agreements at the sectoral level.5 After
government sanctioning, agreements become binding for all those employed in the sector
concerned. So, even though only about 20% of the workers are trade union members,
these unions bargain on behalf of all workers and even represent the unemployed. The
system of Collective Agreements that are sanctioned by government, as well as
government participation in negotiations and consultations at the central level, is
supported explicitly by employers and employees. One of the results is social stability:
strikes are very rare in the Netherlands. In addition, the rather implicit role of the
government ensures that agreements are based on consensus. Consequently, wage drift is
relatively small in the Netherlands.
2.3 Wage flexibility
The institutional setting suggests quite strict and similar wage developments at least
within (sub)sectors.  There are, however, reasons why there may be more wage flexibility
in practice than these institutional circumstances would suggest.
An important reason is that centrally bargained agreements typically have an
influence on the wage scales and wage grades that companies use. This shifting of the
scales would lead to an equal rise in workers' wages if all workers remained at the same
position in these scales. However, the main part of workers' wage development comes
from their careers, within or across firms. Through their careers, workers move up the
wage grades and scales, which lead to higher average wage increases than those that are
5 Since 1997, sectoral agreements no longer need to be sanctioned.
9centrally agreed upon. An example is given in Dohmen (2004): In a large manufacturing
firm in the Netherlands, workers move up wage grades and scales, while the underlying
matrix of scales are shifted to accommodate centrally agreed wage changes. Many Dutch
firms apply modern human resource practices with performance interviews determining
the position of a worker on the wage scale.
Another reason for flexible and divergent development in pay in the Netherlands
is the prevalent use of incentive pay. This incentive pay is linked to either quantitative
performance measures or qualitative evaluations. At least part of the pay is thus linked to
objective or subjective evaluations of performance. Borghans and Kriechel (2006) give
an overview of the use of incentive pay and its influence on the moments of wage
distribution. They show that the use of incentive pay is quite high across most sectors,
and that the introduction of incentive pay has had an influence on the distribution within
firms. Stegeman (2000) also reports that many Dutch firms use some kind of incentive
pay.
2.5 Economic Development in 1999-2003
In the late 90s, the Dutch economy was booming, partly as a result of international
developments in the IT sector. Unemployment decreased rapidly. As the increase in the
supply of higher educated workers diminished, while their demand increased, the labor
market position of this group improved. Among lower and intermediately educated
workers, the main increase in demand was in the building industry, which experienced a
rapid increase in employment of 20% between 1996 and 2001 (ROA, 2005).
Table 1 provides some basic statistics about the development of the labor market
in the period 1996-2005.6 The table shows that until 2000, the Dutch economy was doing
quite well. Annual GDP growth was around 3% for some time. Since unemployment was
at a high level in the 80s and in particular higher educated workers had a poor labor
market position, it took some time before scarcity was felt in the labor market. In 1998,
firms started to have problems recruiting higher educated workers, vacancy rates
6 The shaded area in the table gives the time period for the analysis performed in Section 3. We have
included the other years to show the developments that have led to the examined time period. For the most
recent years, the detailed microdata was not available yet.
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increased and unemployment dropped. The period of 1998-2002 was characterized by
relatively high wage increases as a response to these developments.
 – Table 1 –
The contractual wage increase indicates the wage increase that workers would
receive if the collective agreements were the only cause for a change in wages. In
practice, however, workers also experience wage increases due to promotion, change of
job and incidental increases in pay because of good performance. The table shows that
contractual wage increases where large from 1998 until 2003. In 2001, 2002, and 2003,
these contractual increases where actually larger than the growth of GDP. Usually the
incidental component in wage increases equals approximately 0.7, but employers use the
possibilities of incidental increases as instruments in the competition for workers. This
was obviously the case in 2000 and 2001, which were years characterized by high
vacancy rates. The unemployment rate also decreased until 2001 and started to increase
from 2002 onwards.
3 Data and Variables
The analyses in this paper are based on administrative sources collected by Statistics
Netherlands. We have used two administrative data sets.
First, the GBA (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie) contains information about the
demographic characteristics and household compositions of all inhabitants of the
Netherlands. The data origin from the register is kept within the municipalities. Since all
Dutch municipalities use the same unified system for their registers, this joint database is
a useful basis for linking various sources. From the GBA, we have used the gender and
age of the person.
The second source that we have used is the “SSB Banenbestand” (Social
Statistical Database of Jobs). In this dataset, Statistics Netherlands has combined
information about all Dutch employment relationships from various administrative
sources. The two main sources are the social insurance administration
(Verzekeringsadministratie werknemers, VZA) and the fiscal database (Fibase), which
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collects information on income taxes. Statistics Netherlands has combined the different
sources, verified the information from the different sources, and developed decision rules
to combine information in case of inconsistencies. Cases in the database that appear not
to reflect a real employment relationship, but are merely financial transactions, have been
excluded. An example of this could be a mistake that has been made in the salary of a
former employee. Later, when the firm pays the remaining salary, this appears in the
administration as a one-day employment relationship with a relatively high salary.
The data is employment-based, so every employment relationship is an
observation. Since workers may move from one firm to another within a year and may
have multiple employment relationships simultaneously, there are more employment
relationships than workers. The data set contains about 10 million cases annually. It is
organized as a combination of event history and annual data set. For each change in
employment relationships, a new observation is generated. Wages, however, are included
on an annual basis for each employment relationship separately. Wage changes or a
change of job within a firm will not lead to a new observation, but wages earned in
different firms are registered separately.
Wages
Within the SSB, the wage information is based on administrative data from the insurance
and fiscal authorities. The data set contains all wage earners living in the Netherlands
with their annual incomes.7 The incomes should be regarded as fiscal, gross salaries.
Included in the information from the tax offices are also the number of days a worker has
worked.
For some counts (e.g. firm size) a fixed date within a year had to be chosen. We
decided to ‘cut’ the data at a specific date. We have used the third Thursday in
September, avoiding cut points that have administrative significance or cut points that
happen to fall in weekends or major vacations. For the subsequent analysis, in cases
where multiple employment relationships for a single worker existed, only the
7 The self-employed are not included in this database. Statistics Netherlands is currently developing a
similar but separate database for this specific group.
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employment relationship within one year that generated the highest income was used for
a worker.8
We used the gross fiscal annual wages and the number of days a worker was
reported to have worked in order to calculate the gross monthly wages in euros. We were
unable to control for working hours, but we were able to adjust for the number of days
employed within a year.9 Wage differences were simple deductions of the previous year’s
wage of the current wage.
 It is possible to match various administrative sources using the ID number
(“SOFI-nummer”, i.e. the social security number) of people working and/or living in the
Netherlands. For privacy reasons, Statistics Netherlands transforms this ID number into
the so-called RIN number. In this way, personal information can still be matched but
users of the file cannot search for the social security number of a specific person.
Tenure
Tenure can be measured accurately. It is calculated on the basis of the day of entry into a
firm, which is known in the data. We have calculated the tenure in years based on the cut-
off point in September.
Demographics
The age of a worker is known through the year and month of birth that is available in the
data. In addition, there is information on gender, household composition, and changes of
a person's address based on the municipal database.
Firm
Firms are identified by a firm ID. The definition of a firm is based on an economic
definition developed by Statistics Netherlands. When a holding consists of units that are
fairly independent in their daily management, these units are considered to be separate
firms.
8 An exception is made for the exit and entry rates. These are based on all contracts within a year.
9 Average monthly working hours are reported only for a non-representative subset of the population.
Using working hours would halve the population used.
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Mobility
Worker mobility was measured by the number of contracts, with a minimum duration of
90 days, ending within the year. We excluded the prolongation of year-to-year contracts.
While most workers have only one contract at a time, it is possible that a worker has
several employment contracts simultaneously. Thus a single worker can, in principal,
cause several ‘exits’ within a year.
Selection of the data
For the analyses, we used only information about employees who were employed for at
least 3 months and had an annual income in excess of ¼ of the annual minimum wage.
This excluded short-term contracts and those that contained only very few hours a week.
Furthermore, since we are especially interested in differences in wages between workers
in the same firm, we excluded from the analyses all workers in firms with less than 10
workers.
4 Results
The data allow us to investigate the wage structure, wage changes, and mobility patterns
of the Dutch economy in the period of 1999-2003. Due to the associated firm employee
character of the data, the wage structure within the firm can be compared to the overall
wage structure.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the distribution of individual wages and
the distribution of mean wages of firms. Since smaller firms pay on average substantially
lower wages than larger firms, the wage levels of the average firm is lower than the
corresponding levels among individuals. Of course, inequality is greater among
individuals than among firms. The standard deviation among individuals is about twice
the standard deviation of mean wages in firms.
 – Table 2 –
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Table 3 summarizes the wage distributions within firms. On average, the
coefficient of variation within firms is below the national coefficient of variation. About
25 % of the firms, however, had a higher wage inequality than the national average, since
75th percentile equals about this national coefficient of variation of 0.6, as can be found in
Table 2.
 – Table 3 –
Table 4 compares the within-firm wage distribution with the overall wage
distribution. It confirms that for the average firm the standard deviation of wages is about
half the overall standard deviation of wages. Since firms with a higher average pay also
have higher standard deviations, the firms with high wage inequality have about the same
inequality as the overall distribution here.
 – Table 4 –
In Table 5, we take a look at the wage growth measured as the change in log
wages. The growth figures approximately reflect the macro figures presented in Section
2. As smaller firms especially increased wages between 2001 and 2002, we found large
increases at firm level in this period. Both at the individual level and at the firm level, the
10th percentile of the annual change is negative, with the exception of the period 2001-
2002 at firm level. Since the wages are not deflated, this reveals that a substantial fraction
of firms and individuals faced wage decreases every year.
 – Table 5 –
In Table 6, we present the distribution of exit rates over time. This is done
separately for all firms, in the first column of a year, and for large firms with 100
employees or more in the second column of a year. In general the exit rates diminish
from 2000 to 2003. Starting at a median of 23.66 percent in 2000 and ending at 17
percent in 2003. This reduction is mainly due to firms at the upper end of the distribution,
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that is, with the highest exit rates, which is lowered over time. Large firms consistently
have 2-3 percent lower than average exit rates. The exit rate by the position of a firm in
the wage distribution shows that the higher exit rates are generated by the lower paying
firms.
 – Table 6 –
The increase in wages was not distributed equally among workers. To investigate the
development of wages in greater detail, we split the sample in 99 percentile groups, based
on wages in 2001, with all workers in the 0.5 to 1.5 percentile in the first group, all
workers in the 1.5 to 2.5 percentile in the second group, etc. When comparing different
groups, we keep these brackets constant. Figure 1 provides the change in wages from
2000 – 2002. Since the percentile groups are based on wages in 2001, we avoided
reversal to the mean effects due to measurement error or incidental changes in wages.
The figure compares wage growth of men and women. It shows that there is a
general tendency for an increase in wage inequality as wages for workers with high
incomes grew more than wages for low-wage workers. This holds especially for men. For
women we observed an above-average wage increase for the group in between the 5-th
and the 40-th percentile.
 – Figure 1 –
Figure 2 makes a similar comparison between age groups. As can be expected,
young workers faced larger wage increases than older workers. This difference was very
substantial, however, also when comparing these figures internationally (Lazear and
Shaw, 2006). Another interesting feature of the graph is that the wage increase for young
workers was high compared to other workers in all percentile groups. This implies that
young workers who already earned wages that were very high with respect to the overall
wage distribution, experienced wage increases far beyond the wage increase of older
workers with the same wages.
16
 – Figure 2 –
In Figure 3, different firm sizes are compared. Although wages are strongly
correlated with firm size, the surprising finding here is that the growth of wages –
conditional on the wage level – is very similar for all size groups. This result is clearly
consistent with a human capital interpretation of wages. When smaller firms pay lower
wages because they hire people with lower levels of human capital, but wages only
depend on the value of human capital in the market, the change in wages should be the
same for all types of firms when conditioning on the wage level.
 – Figure 3 –
These findings changed completely when we compared different industries.
Figures 4-6 provide the wage growth patterns for 10 broad clusters of industries. There
are some clear differences between industries. Especially the building industry has a
pattern that deviates from the rest. Workers with wages in the lower percentiles of the
Dutch wage distribution experienced wage increases that are comparable to the wage
increases of the top earners in this industry. Employment in the building industry was
expanding rapidly in the period 1996-2001, so this wage pattern seems to reflect the
increased demand for low-skilled workers in this industry.
 – Figure 4 - 6 –
The findings therefore suggest that in the structure of wages in the Netherlands is largely
related to changes in the scarcity and value of human capital. A remaining question is to
what extent these developments are correlated at the firm level and how much they can
vary at the individual level. For this reason, we decomposed the wage increase in the
period 2001-2002 in industry effects, firm effects and individual effects. The first column
of Table 7 provides the variance of wages if each worker had experienced the same
(relative) wage increase within each industry. For these analyses, we used the 2-digit
industry classification, which consists of 57 different industries. The second column
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gives the variance of wages, assuming that each worker faced the average wage increase
within his firm. The third column provides the individual variance of wages.
 – Table 7 –
Based on this, the contribution to the wage inequality can be split into an industry
component, a firm component and an individual component, as is shown in column 4-6 of
the table. These tables provide the corresponding figures for splits of the data in different
dimensions.
Overall, an interesting observation is that there was very little variation in wage
growth between industries. This implies that either the agreements at national level
dominated the collective agreements at industrial level or that these collective agreements
played only a very small role in wage determination.
Wage growth differences at firm level contributed on average for 12% to the
differences in wage growth. The remaining 87% of the variation referred to individual
differences. Wage growth in the Netherlands was thus mainly determined at the
individual level. For men, the individual component was larger than for women.
Differences between age groups are very small. A substantial difference in this respect
was found when we compared firms of different sizes. In the smallest firms, of 10-19
employees, 36% of the variation in wages was at the firm level, while in the large firms
of more than 1000 employees, this is only 4%. This suggests that in small firms, which
are in general less involved in negotiations for collective agreements, there was a strong
tendency to give all workers approximately the same wage increase. In large firms, which
sometimes even have their own collective agreement, not much of a firm effect was
observed. Column 2 shows that this difference was to a large part due to the variation in
average wage increases at the firm level. There is much more variation between wage
increases of smaller firms than between larger firms.
At the sectoral level (1-digit) the highest firm-specific components were observed
in agriculture. In education and care, the between-firm variation was much smaller than
in other industries. Here apparently firms followed national agreements in wage growth
more closely than in other industries.
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Apart from negotiating wages with their current employers, employees can of
course also influence their wages by changing employer. To investigate whether wage
developments at sector and firm levels were related to exit rates, we calculated for each
worker the difference between the average wage increase in his sector or firm and the
average economy-wide wage increase. We used only wage increases for workers who did
not change firm. We determined 99 percentile groups, varying from very low relative
wage growth in the sector or firm (0.5 – 1.5th percentile) to very high relative wage
growth in the sector or firm (98.5 – 99.5th percentile). The thin line in Figure 8 provides
the exit rates for these 99 groups, as a function of the sectoral wage growth. The fat line
provides a similar line for firm-level wage growth. The figure reveals that the exit rate in
firms that experienced a relative decrease in wages was higher as the difference in wage
development was larger. On the other hand, firms that paid higher wage increases than
other firms in the same industry, also experienced more mobility when the difference in
wage development was large.  At sector level, we found a similar pattern.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we documented the wage structure and labor mobility of the Dutch labor
market between 1999 and 2003. The analyses are based on the administrative records
collected by Statistics Netherlands that became available recently. The data allow for
detailed descriptions of the wage structure between and within firms, following workers
in time.
In the period 1999 – 2003, wage inequality increased. Especially workers in the
lowest wage percentiles experienced lower wage increases than the median workers,
while wage increases for top earners were substantially higher. The evidence in the paper
suggests that wage determination in the Netherlands is to a large extent determined by
market forces. Workers with similar wages experience similar wage increases
irrespective of firm size. Wages for low-skilled workers in industries with a large
increase in demand, grow faster than in other industries and between-industry and
between-firm variation in wages is low compared to the individual component.
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Table 1
Key indicators of the Dutch labor market from 1996 - 2005
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001b 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDP growth 3.0 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.5 1.4 0.1 -0.1 1.7 0.9
Contract wages (annual growth) 1.9 2.3 3.1 2.9 3.2 4.2 3.5 2.7 1.5 0.8
Incidental wages (annual growth) 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.6 2.8 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.4
Labor force (x million)c 6.686 6.832 6.941 7.069 7.187 7.314 7.337 7.401 7.398 7.401
Labor supply (x million) 5.808 5.992 6.166 6.309 6.423 6.636 6.620 6.563 6.454 6.421
of which:
Public sector (x million) .698 .700 .713 .722 .731 .778 .800 .817 .806 .798
Private sector (x million) 5.110 5.291 5.453 5.587 5.692 5.858 5.819 5.745 5.648 5.623
Employed (x million) 4.338 4.500 4.671 4.825 4.931 5.080 5.050 4.980 4.888 4.859
Self-employed (x million) .772 .791 .782 .762 .760 .778 .769 .765 .760 .765
Person per full-time year (%) 126 126 126 126 126 125 126 126 126 127
Employed workers (x million) 6.185 6.384 6.587 6.768 6.917 7.020 7.035 7.001 6.919 6.918
Unemployment (%) 7.5 6.6 5.1 4.3 3.8 3.5 4.1 5.4 6.5 6.5
Vacancies (x1000) 68 85 123 158 188 182 135 99 109 139
a Source: CPB (2006), pp. 178-179, 184-185
b The series were revised in 2001. The figures after revision have been reported here.
c The labor force is defined as the sum of the employed and the unemployed labor force
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Table 2
The distribution of individual wage and the mean wages within firms
Individual level Firm level
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Median wage 2176 2237 2322 2384 2441 1868 1919 2009 2079 2142
Mean wage 2472 2543 2646 2710 2767 1923 1976 2077 2142 2206
Standard
deviation 1650 1759 1795 1730 1986 758 852 951 917 1107
Coef. of var. 0.667 0.692 0.678 0.638 0.718 0.394 0.431 0.458 0.428 0.502
P90 3706 3821 4008 4125 4211 2626 2694 2857 2970 3066
P75 2785 2867 2992 3083 3151 2226 2284 2400 2490 2571
P25 1722 1753 1799 1833 1867 1502 1532 1587 1631 1672
P10 1420 1431 1452 1468 1485 1165 1182 1201 1217 1249
a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Table 3
Distribution of the coefficient of variation within firms
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Median coefficient of variation 0.4831 0.4886 0.491 0.4904 0.4832
Mean coefficient of variation 0.5055 0.5116 0.5148 0.5133 0.5081
Standard deviation of CV 0.2073 0.2042 0.2064 0.2049 0.2096
P90 coefficient of variation 0.7487 0.7525 0.7631 0.7613 0.7580
P75 coefficient of variation 0.6036 0.6104 0.6145 0.6160 0.6107
P25 coefficient of variation 0.3752 0.3820 0.3835 0.3793 0.3723
P10 coefficient of variation 0.2845 0.2907 0.2902 0.2874 0.2817
a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Table 4
Comparison of overall wage distribution with wage distributions within the firm
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Firm mean s.d. / country s.d 0.5987 0.5839 0.6056 0.6393 0.5715
Firm sd/country mean 0.3067 0.3348 0.3595 0.3383 0.4001
90/10 within firm to 90/10 of country 0.1624 0.1615 0.1530 0.1495 0.1472
90/10 of firm means to 90/10 of country 0.8637 0.8536 0.8618 0.8685 0.8657
Within firm 90% sd relative to the country sd 0.9436 0.9102 0.9566 1.0214 0.9058
Within firm 10% sd relative to the country sd 0.2892 0.2847 0.2880 0.3065 0.2697
Between firm 90% relative to country 90% 0.7086 0.7051 0.7128 0.7200 0.7281
Between firm 10% relative to country 10% 0.8204 0.8260 0.8271 0.8290 0.8411
a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Table 5
Distribution of the annual change of individual log wage and the mean log wage within firms
Individuals Firms
’99-00 ’00-01 ’01-02 ’02-03 ’99-00 ’00-01 ’01-02 ’02-03
Median 0.046 0.063 0.048 0.038 0.058 0.069 0.135 0.046
Mean 0.058 0.075 0.060 0.045 0.061 0.071 0.162 0.047
Standard deviation 0.188 0.199 0.195 0.204 0.145 0.151 0.127 0.143
P90 0.193 0.217 0.196 0.175 0.171 0.184 0.310 0.148
P75 0.097 0.116 0.098 0.829 0.103 0.114 0.211 0.086
P25 0.013 0.025 0.011 0.002 0.022 0.028 0.077 0.012
P10 -0.050 -0.038 -0.055 -0.063 -0.032 -0.031 0.040 -0.039
a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Table 6
Yearly exit rates, for all firms and firms with 100 employees or more, and at several percentiles of the wage distribution
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003
Firm size All > 100  All > 100 All > 100 All > 100
Median 0.2000 0.1697 0.1961 0.1635 0.1765 0.1455 0.1343 0.1071
Mean 0.2366 0.2008 0.2318 0.1964 0.2160 0.1817 0.1700 0.1374
Standard Deviation 0.1692 0.1225 0.1744 0.1257 0.1771 0.1328 0.1539 0.1088
P90 0.4286 0.3393 0.4286 0.3408 0.4118 0.3200 0.3333 0.2644
P75 0.3015 0.2500 0.3000 0.2479 0.2791 0.2241 0.2286 0.1773
P25 0.1250 0.1204 0.1154 0.1150 0.1000 0.1014 0.0714 0.0692
P10 0.0727 0.0893 0.0667 0.0821 0.0556 0.0717 0.0000 0.0439
Position in Wage Distribution
P90 0.189 0.190 0.184  0.140
P75 0.183 0.175 0.166  0.126
P50  0.228 0.219 0.204  0.158
P25 0.275 0.271 0.250  0.202
P10 0.333 0.331 0.297  0.233
a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Table 7
Decomposition of the variance of wage growth 2001-2002 in between-industry, between-firms and between-individuals components,
by gender, age group, firm size and industry
Variance Percentage
Between
industries
Between
firms
Between
individuals Industry Firm Individual
Overall 0.00022 0.00310 0.02456 0.89 11.73 87.38
Gender
Male 0.00018 0.00258 0.02405 0.74 10.00 89.26
Female 0.00026 0.00366 0.02506 1.05 13.56 85.39
Age
<=25 0.00022 0.00423 0.03019 0.74 13.25 86.00
26-35 0.00029 0.00433 0.03392 0.86 11.90 87.24
36-45 0.00024 0.00315 0.02368 1.01 12.29 86.70
46-55 0.00019 0.00249 0.01629 1.19 14.09 84.71
55+ 0.00019 0.00252 0.01681 1.15 13.87 84.98
Firm size
10-19 0.00026 0.01147 0.03100 0.82 36.17 63.01
20-49 0.00025 0.00802 0.03034 0.83 25.60 73.57
50-99 0.00025 0.00580 0.02936 0.86 18.90 80.24
27
100-499 0.00021 0.00281 0.02557 0.81 10.20 88.99
500-999 0.00024 0.00239 0.02501 0.95 8.61 90.45
1000+ 0.00024 0.00103 0.02102 1.16 3.72 95.12
Industry
0 Agriculture 0.00004 0.00523 0.02376 0.18 21.83 77.99
1 Food and textile industry 0.00010 0.00306 0.02150 0.47 13.76 85.77
2 Chemical and metal industry 0.00007 0.00264 0.01981 0.38 12.95 86.67
3 Other industry 0.00007 0.00246 0.01640 0.43 14.59 84.97
4 Building industry 0.00007 0.00420 0.02309 0.30 17.90 81.80
5 Retail and catering 0.00010 0.00470 0.02774 0.37 16.57 83.06
6 Financial services and transport 0.00049 0.00390 0.02907 1.69 11.71 86.59
7 Governance and other services 0.00029 0.00360 0.02869 1.03 11.52 87.45
8 Education and care 0.00000 0.00142 0.02140 0.01 6.64 93.34
9 Culture 0.00006 0.00524 0.02962 0.20 17.48 82.32
a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Figure 1
Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for male and female employees for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Male
Female
a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Figure 2
Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in different age categories for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage
distribution
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a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Figure 3
Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in various firm-size categories for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch
wage distribution
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a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Figure 4
Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in agriculture, food and textile industry, chemical and metal industry and
other industries for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
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a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Figure 5
Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in the building industry, retail and catering and financial services and
transport for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
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a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Figure 6
Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in public administration and other services, education and care and
culture for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
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a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
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Figure 8
Job mobility in 2001 related to the wage development in a sector or firm relative to the overall wage growth
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a Own calculations based on the Job files from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
